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Early voting actually decreases election turnout, if implemented
on its own.
Politicians and commentators have been concerned about election turnout rates for
decades, and there have been significant efforts to make voting easier in order to
address this concern. Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer, and
Donald P. Moynihan take a close look at the policy of early voting across the U.S.
They find that, if implemented on its own, early voting has the effect of actually
decreasing turnout, by robbing election day of its otherwise stimulating effect on
nonvoters and marginal voters. The authors argue that the most effective way to
increase turnout is to allow voters to register when they vote, on election day, or
beforehand.
Advocates, journalists, and politicians frequently propose changes to election laws
out of the belief that making voting easier will increase voter turnout. It seems logical
that more people will vote if we make voting more convenient – in the United States
this takes the form of relaxed voter registration rules, registration on, and voting prior
to, election day, or expanded absentee voting. We challenge this notion, and show that the most popular reform
adopted by US state governments – early voting – actually decreases turnout when implemented by itself, an
unanticipated consequence that has significant implications for policy and for theories of how state governments
can influence turnout.
The idea that early voting could reduce turnout is counterintuitive, and it certainly runs against the grain of
conventional wisdom.  We make sense of this by pointing out that the overall impact of any election law on turnout
depends on its net consequences and its joint effect with other election laws.  The net consequences are based
on both direct and indirect effects.  Direct effects stem from the costs imposed by the state, and include
registration requirements, polling locations and hours, and rules such as identification requirements.  Most
research has focused on these direct effects while ignoring how election laws indirectly affect mobilization by non-
governmental actors such as the media, campaigns, interest groups, friends, and family.  These actors indirectly
raise or lower the costs of voting depending on how much information they provide and the social incentives for
voting they generate.  The added convenience of early voting decreases the direct costs of voting, but this effect is
more than offset by a reduction in mobilization efforts, resulting in lower net turnout. The joint effect of election
laws is also important.  The combinations of election day registration (EDR), same day registration (SDR), and
early voting have different impacts on turnout depending on how they are combined.  For example, on their own,
EDR increases turnout and early voting decreases it.  Combining the two offsets the negative effect of early
voting.
Before explaining these results, we should define the various types of laws.  Early voting, as we define it,
constitutes practices that permit voters to cast ballots without excuse prior to election day. Early voting in the US
has more than quadrupled since the early 1990s, increasing from 7 percent of all votes in 1992 to over 30 percent
in 2012. Now more than half of the states allow early voting in some form.  EDR permits eligible voters to both
register and vote on election day. This should increase turnout by eliminating the need for two separate actions:
registering in advance and then casting a ballot at a later date.  Same-day registration (SDR) permits people to
both register and vote in a single act prior to election day.  It thus reduces the potential inconvenience of having to
vote on a specific election day, eliminates the registration closing date, and permits “one-stop shopping.”
Early voting, by itself, does not help people who are not already registered to vote.  SDR and especially EDR
eliminate this problem by allowing individuals who become interested late in the campaign to be mobilized into
voting.  By offering more days on which to vote, early voting lowers the direct costs of voting, but mostly as a
convenience for those who were already planning to vote.  Registration statistics confirms this effect: in the states
that had early voting and SDR in 2008, 3.6 million same day registration applications were filed; of those, only
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963,144 (or about 27 percent) were new voters added to the registration rolls for the first time.  Early voting almost
certainly brings out some new
voters who would have difficulty
making it to the polls on election
day (the direct effect), but it more
than offsets this increase by
dissipating the energy of election
day over a longer period of time
and reducing mobilization (the
indirect effect).
We suggest that early voting robs
election day of the stimulating
effect it would otherwise have on
nonvoters or marginal voters.
 This stimulation can come via
the social incentives and civic
activities that surround election
day.  Political campaigns also
strategically consider the political
environment as they choose to
invest resources to mobilize
voters.  Partisan contacts, direct mail, phone calls, leafleting, and mass media, levels of competition and
campaign spending, campaign advertising, campaign yard signs, texts, party transfers to states and campaign
visits by presidential candidates all have an impact on turnout.  Campaigns may draw down their mobilization
efforts when they have already brought in large numbers of early voters: there may be less advertising and fewer
efforts to organize election day activities.  We find that presidential campaign advertising tails off in states with
significant early voting in comparison to states without it.  When much of the eligible population has already voted
in advance of election day, there is less payoff for continued get-out-the-vote activities.  If this reduced activity in
high early voting states is not counterbalanced by the increased convenience of voting prior to the election, the net
effect would be negative.
This claim is supported by the simple bivariate data shown in Figure 1.  States with higher levels of early voting
have lower turnout: 
Figure 1: Early Voting and Turnout in the States in 2008
Note: Dotted regression line represents all states. Solid regression line omits Oregon and
Washington, which conduct elections by mail.
Our analysis controls for alternative explanations with individual and county-level data from the 2004 and 2008
presidential elections using a variety of methods.  Our empirical claims stand up to these various tests: despite
being the most popular election reform, early voting depresses net voter turnout and the only consistent way to
increase turnout is to permit election day registration.  This effect is only partially offset if SDR is present, or if
EDR offers a vehicle for the last-minute mobilization of marginal voters. This result upends the conventional view
that anything that makes voting easier will raise turnout.  At the same time, our results offer a clear prescription for
policymakers who seek to increase turnout: let voters register when they vote.
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